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Abstract 
 
Exporter wage premium has been widely studied in the literature on international trade. 
The aim of this paper is analyze whether there is also a producer quality wage premium 
at firm level, and if so, analyze whether its origin is similar to the exporter wage 
premium. In other words, I test whether firms that increase their product quality become 
more productive and pay higher wages (as with the learning by exporting hypothesis, 
we can speak of learning by producing quality), or, in contrast, more-productive firms 
with higher wages opt to increase product quality because their higher productivity 
means these kinds of decisions and investments can be taken with more guarantees 
(self-selection hypothesis). Moreover, I find on the one hand, that firms which start to 
increase their product quality have a higher probability of exporting than firms that 
never increase their product quality, and on the other, that firms which start to export 
increase their product quality more than firms that never export. However, in no cases 
do I find evidence in favour of learning by exporting or by producing quality 
hypotheses. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Since the pioneering paper by Bernard and Jensen (1995) many papers on exporter 
wage premium have appeared. Wagner (2007, 2012) and Schank et al. (2010) mention 
most of them and summarize their contributions. The main motivation of this paper 
stems from Alcalá and Hernández (2010), where we build a theoretical model that 
suggests that wage premium of exporter firms and their higher human capital are due to 
their higher product quality. More-productive firms can overcome entry costs onto 
international markets (and national ones1) and they produce higher quality goods. This 
relation also generates a rise in human capital and in the average wage of the firm. 
However, the relation between wages and product quality could not be confirmed 
because the dataset used in this paper held no information about quality product. 
Therefore, this paper attempts to mitigate this shortcoming by analyzing the correlations 
between the quality of the product, the exports and the average wages of the firm. 
 
 There are several papers that have analyzed empirical positive correlations 
between exports, quality and productivity and wages in firms or establishments. 
Verhoogen (2008) finds that more-productive establishments produce higher-quality 
goods than less-productive establishments, and they pay higher wages to maintain a 
higher-quality workforce. In many cases, the arguments for this empirical relation are 
based on the literature on firm-size wage premium (Idson and Oi, 1999) and exporter 
wage premium (Bernard and Jensen, 1995). Kugler and Verhoogen (2011) use a 
measure of the scope for quality differentiation from Sutton (1998) and find that the 
output price-plant size and input price-plant size elasticities are greater in sectors with 
more scope for quality differentiation. Verhoogen (2008) finds that more-productive 
plants increase the export share of sales, wages and the likelihood of ISO 9000 
certification more than less-productive plants. Guadalupe (2007) argues that increased 
product market competition leads to higher returns to skill, because high-skilled 
workers produce at lower costs, and there is stronger competition between firms to 
attract better workers. A similar point of view is taken by Bustos (2011), who finds that 
                                                 
1 Similar effects are obtained between establishments in national-market versus local-market. 
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trade liberalization induces the most productive firms, usually exporters, to adopt skill-
intensive production technologies2. 
 
 Most of these papers suppose that firms that increase their product quality 
become more productive and pay higher wages, similar to the learning-by-exporting 
hypothesis for exporter firms. However, the causal relation could also be the opposite. 
Higher productivity in exporting firms is due to self-selection of more productive firms 
in export markets (self-selection hypothesis). This may also be applicable to firms that 
increase their product quality. More-productive firms with higher wages decide to 
increase product quality because their higher productivity means these kinds of 
decisions and investments can be taken with more guarantees.  
 
 There is a wealth of literature on which hypothesis is more relevant - learning-
by-exporting or self-selection - in the case of exporter firms. Singh (2010) concludes 
that, at firm level, the studies supporting self-selection clearly outnumber the studies 
supporting learning-by-exporting. But, in the case of relations between product quality 
and productivity or wages, there are no studies which analyze their causality. Therefore, 
this paper has three aims: i) to ascertain whether a producer quality wage premium 
exists; ii) to analyze whether firms that increase their product quality become more 
productive and pay higher wages (learning-by-producing-quality hypothesis), or, in 
contrast, more-productive firms with higher wages decide to increase their product 
quality (self-selection hypothesis), and iii) to investigate the potential simultaneity 
between exports and increases in product quality. 
 
 To carry out the latter two aims I use a methodology similar to that proposed by 
Schank et al. (2010) in the context of exporter firms. These authors contrast the 
learning-by-exporting versus self-selection hypothesis using a dataset of German linked 
employer-employee and obtain empirical evidence for the latter. Papers that focus on 
the relation between firm heterogeneity and exports (Melitz, 2003 and Greenaway and 
Kneller, 2007) are the theoretical basis of this result.3.  
                                                 
2 Bernard et al. (2011) review this empirical evidence on firm heterogeneity in international trade. 
 
3 There are several papers which have analyzed this question in Spain, paying attention to the estimated 
total factor productivity. Delgado et al. (2003) obtain evidence in favour of the self-selection hypothesis, 
but Mañez et al. (2010) find evidence in favour of the learning-by-exporting hypothesis. Manjón et al. 
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The Spanish dataset used to analyze the effect of product quality on wages is the 
Encuesta Sobre Estrategias Empresariales (Survey on Companies’ Strategies, 
hereinafter, ESEE). With this dataset, I will use the measure for quality from Sutton (the 
R&D and advertising intensity) and information from a categorical variable which 
indicates whether the firm has carried out or contracted quality standardization and 
control works, because the dataset does not contain information about ISO certification. 
I will analyze whether the correlations of theses measures for quality with other 
variables are as expected. Subsequently, I estimate demand equations for skilled 
workers and wages equations, adding these measures for quality in order to test whether 
product quality generates the expected positive effects on human capital and average 
wages of the firm. 
 
 Direction of causality will be analyzed using the definition of firms that start to 
produce with higher quality, versus firms that do not increase their product quality. The 
test analyzes how higher product quality affects firms that start these actions in 
subsequent years. If higher product quality increases wages and productivity, we would 
observe a wage rise and productivity rise in subsequent years after the decision to 
increase product quality. In contrast, if the relevant hypothesis is that more-productive 
firms decide to increase product quality, we would not observe any statistically 
significant temporal effects. I use this same methodology in order to investigate whether 
there is a link between exports and product quality. Specifically, I analyze whether 
firms which start to increase their product quality have a higher probability of exporting 
than firms that never increase their product quality, and whether firms which start to 
export increase their product quality more than firms which never export. 
  
 The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the dataset and the two 
indicators used to measure product quality: R&D and advertising expenditures over 
sales and carrying out or contracting standardization and control works. Section 3 
estimates demand equations for skilled employees (college graduates and engineers) and 
                                                                                                                                               
(2012) indicate that the assumptions used about the evolution of productivity and the role of export status 
turns out to be critical in finding evidence in favour of either hypothesis. The advantage of using an 
observed variable, such as wages, instead of estimated productivity to test these hypotheses is that we do 
not need to impose additional assumptions. 
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wages equations. These estimations show positive correlations between exports, product 
quality and human capital and average wages of the firm. Section 4 studies the direction 
of the causality and tests the hypothesis that higher product quality increase wages and 
productivities or whether more-productive firms decide to raise product quality. Section 
5 analyzes the link between exports and product quality, and Section 6 summarizes and 
concludes. 
 
 
2. THE DATA 
 
The ESEE (this survey has its origin in an agreement signed in 1990 between the 
Ministry of Industry and the SEPI Foundation, formerly the Fundación Empresa 
Pública (Public Firm Foundation)) is an unbalanced panel of Spanish manufacturing 
firms in operation since 1990. The database contains information about an average 
sample of 1,800 firms every year, and includes information about activity, products and 
manufacturing processes, customers and suppliers, costs and prices, markets covered, 
technological activities, income statements, accounting balance sheets, employment and 
foreign trade. Firms with less than 10 employees were excluded from the survey. All 
firms which have over 200 employees are included along with a random sample of the 
rest (firms with 10 to 200 employees). Most of the variables included are yearly, but 
there are others where the information is only updated every four years, such as the 
percentage of college graduates and engineers of total employees and the information 
about works carried out or contracted by the firms on normalization and quality control. 
 
 Table A1 in the appendix gives a brief statistical description of some interesting 
variables. Average wages of the firm are labour cost per employee (labour cost divided 
per yearly average of total employment). Exporter firms have higher wages and higher 
sales per employee than non-exporter firms, and are also larger. The percentage of 
exporter firms with more than 49 employees is 69.4%, whereas in non-exporters it is 
only 19.6%. The percentage of college graduates and engineers is 5.6% in exporter and 
2.9% in non-exporter firms (38% of the firms do not have employees with postgraduate 
degrees). The percentage of total sales exported (export propensity) is 28.9% for 
exporter firms. We also observe that the percentage of firms which control their quality 
is 55.5% within exporter firms, whereas within non-exporter firms it is only 27.1%. The 
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percentage of R&D and advertising expenditures over sales is also higher in exporter 
firms - 2.7% versus 1.4% for non-exporter firms. 
 
 The ESEE does not contain information about whether a firm has any ISO 
certification of its product quality. Therefore, we use a measure for quality from Sutton 
(1998) –R&D and advertising expenditures over sales- and the information obtained 
every four years about whether a firm has carried out or contracted quality 
standardization and control works (quality control). We can observe in the following 
tables that these measures for quality behave as expected. Table 1 shows how in all the 
years where information on control quality is available there is a positive relation 
between this variable and the percentage of college graduates and engineers, the export 
propensity (percentage of sales exported) and the average wage of the firm. These same 
positive correlations are observed between R&D and advertising expenditures over sales 
and the percentage of graduates and the average firm wage (for all years between 1990 
and 2010 in the latter case). The positive correlations between R&D and advertising 
expenditures over sales and export propensity are not significant only in 1991 and 1992  
 
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
 Table 2 also shows a positive relation between these variables by industries. In 
the vast majority of cases theses correlations are significant. The correlations between 
R&D and advertising expenditures over sales and export propensity are not significant 
in Meat products, Food and tobacco, Paper and Computer products, Electronics and 
Optical products.  
 
Insert Table 2 about here 
 
 Table 3 shows several ratios by years between the measures of product quality, 
average firm wage, exporter status and percentage of college graduates and engineers of 
the firm. In the first three columns we can see that the firms which invest in R&D and 
advertising have higher percentages of college graduates, higher wages and greater 
export propensity than firms which do not invest, since all the ratios are higher than one. 
This same behaviour is observed the second three columns for firms which control their 
product quality versus firms which do not. Finally, the last two columns show that R&D 
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and advertising expenditures over sales and quality control are higher in exporter than 
non-exporter firms. 
 
Insert Table 3 about here 
 
3. HUMAN CAPITAL, WAGES AND PRODUCT QUALITY 
 
First I estimate demand equations for skilled employees in order to analyze the 
correlations between theses employees and product quality. A positive correlation 
between exports and human capital of the firm has been pointed to in many papers since 
Bernard and Jensen (1997). Alcalá and Hernández (2010) cite several of them. A 
positive correlation between product quality and demand for skilled employees has been 
recently suggested by Verhoogen (2008) and Bustos (2011).  
 
 In equation (1) the dependent variable ejt is the percentage of collage graduates 
and engineers of the firm j in the year t, and I have chosen the tobit specification to 
estimate the correlations with the age of the firm, the firm size (employees), exporter 
status (a dummy equal to unity when the firm has exported) and the quality indicator: 
 
 
32
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where Size2 is a dummy variable for firm size which corresponds to firms employing 
between 50 and 249 workers and Size3 corresponds to firms with more than 249 
workers. Exporter is the dummy for exporter status and Quality is the quality indicator, 
which can be the R&D and advertising expenses over sales suggested by Sutton (1998) 
or a dummy variable which takes the value one when a firm has carried out or 
contracted quality standardization and control works (I will also estimate specifications 
with both quality indicators). Additionally, I include a vector of dummies for industries 
and another vector γ of dummies for years. 
 
Table 4 shows the results. In column (1) we observe that exporting firms have a 
higher demand for college graduates and engineers (Alcalá and Hernández, 2010). The 
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inclusion of R&D and advertising over sales in column (2) or the inclusion of the 
dummy for control quality in column (3) has a positive effect on demand for college 
graduates and engineers. Marginal effects show that firms which carry out or contract 
quality standardization and control works increase the percentage of college graduates 
and engineers by almost one percentage point. Moreover, a 10 percentage point increase 
in R&D and advertising over sales increases the percentage of college graduates and 
engineers by 1.2 percentage points. The results of interaction terms between quality 
indicators and export propensity and those between quality indicators and dummies for 
firm size are not reported as they are not statistically significant.4 
 
Insert Table 4 about here 
 
 Table 5 shows the estimates of the following wage equation, where the wage of 
the firm, wjt, is the total labour cost divided by the yearly average of total employment 
of the firm j in the year t.  
 
jttjtjt
jtjtjtjtjtjt
uIndustryQuality
ExportereSizeSizeAgew
+++
++++++=
δββ
ββββββ
76
543210 32ln   (2) 
 
 In column (1) we observe the standard results on positive relations between the 
firm size (employees), the human capital of the firm (skilled employees), the exporter 
status and wages. Moreover, older firms pay higher wages. A one-year increase raises 
average firm wages by 0.31%. The exporter wage premium is 8.6% (e(0.083)-1). This 
effect is only slightly less than that obtained by Alcalá and Hernández (2010).5 
 
Columns (2)-(5) include the product quality indicators. The wage effect of R&D 
and advertising expenses over sales is statistically significant only when the percentages 
of college graduates and engineers of the firm in column (4) are not included. In this 
case, a 10 percentage point increase in the percentage of theses expenses increases the 
average wage of the firm by 3%. The wage effect in column (5) of a dummy which 
                                                 
4 Results are available upon request. 
 
5 The exporting wage premium obtained with hourly wages with ESEE -9.3%- is very similar to the 
figure obtained with yearly wages, but I prefer to use yearly wages because the information about the 
number of yearly worked hours in 1990 is very scarce and it reduces the number of observations. 
Nevertheless, those estimates are available upon request. 
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takes the value one when the firm has invested in R&D and advertising and zero 
otherwise has an important and statistically significant effect, because it represents a 
4.4% wage increase. The dummy for quality control is also statistically significant and 
has a similar wage impact. According to column (3), the firms which control their 
product quality pay wages 4.7% higher than firms which do not carry out this control. 
As estimations of demand of college graduates and engineers, the interaction terms 
between quality indicators, exporter status, percentage of college graduates and 
engineers and dummies variables for firm sizes are not statistically significant. 
 
Insert Table 5 about here 
 
4. CAUSALITY 
 
The direction of the causality between product quality and wages may not be the same 
as in the previous analysis, but it is possible that, instead of higher product quality 
increasing productivity and wages of the firms, the more-productive firms –and the 
firms that pay higher wages- decide to increase their product quality. 
 
To carry out this analysis I use a methodology similar to that proposed by 
Schank et al. (2010) in the context of exporter wage premium. Theses authors observe 
how firms behave in periods of consecutive years. They start at a point in time when 
none of the firms exported and end when some have been exporting for a while. The 
latter are called export starters. Estimates of Schank et al. (2010) indicate that wages 
and labour productivity (sales per employee) of exporter starters are higher than non-
exporter firms but that temporal effects are not statistically significant. In other words, 
neither the difference in the wages nor the difference in productivity changes over the 
years either in the years before the starters begin to export or the years after starting to 
export. According to these results, these authors conclude that firms with a higher 
productivity (and higher wages) self-select into export markets. This result is in line 
with the main idea of the model of Melitz (2003), who emphasizes that firm 
heterogeneity is a phenomenon that can help explain the distribution of trade flows. 
Greeneway and Kneller (2007) state that only more-productive firms can bear the higher 
cost of entering international markets. 
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This methodology can be applied to the causality relation between product 
quality and wages. I can define a set of firms which start to increase their product 
quality versus firms which never do. The test also analyzes the evolution of the labour 
productivity and wages of starters before and after the decision to control the quality. If 
this evolution shows a positive increase, we will conclude that higher product quality 
increases productivity and wages. However, if these variables are not affected in the 
years after the increase in quality, even though they are higher than those observed in 
firms which do not increase their product quality, we will conclude that more 
productive firms decide to improve their product quality and, therefore, the direction of 
causality is the opposite. In other words, product quality does not increase productivity, 
but the more productive firms do decide to improve their product quality. 
 
Using R&D and advertising expenses over sales as a measure of product quality 
(Sutton, 1998), we define a firm as starting to improve its product quality if in the four-
year period considered it does not carry out R&D and advertising expenses in the two 
first years and has positive values for this variable in the two following. Moreover, if a 
firm has been observed more than four times in the sample, then in all observed years 
after t = 4 it must have been a quality producer (one investing in R&D and advertising) 
and in all the observed years before t = 1 it must have not invested. If this is not the 
case, the firm must be dropped form the sample. Obviously, we define a firm as not 
improving its product quality when it presents zero values of this variable for all the 
four-year periods considered. With the ESEE data from 1990 to 2010, we can define 18-
year windows (from 1990 to 1993, from 1991 to 1994, …, from 2007 to 2010). These 
data for quality producer starters and non-quality-producer are pooled over these 
eighteen cohorts. So, it is possible that a firm was first a non-quality-producer and then 
a quality producer starter, but not vice versa. 
 
With the other measure of product quality –whether the firm has carried out or 
contracted quality standardization and control works (quality control)- we can only 
ascertain the above for every four years (1990, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006 and 2010). 
Therefore, in this case, I have defined three cohorts of 4 years (from 1990 to 2002, from 
1994 to 2006 and from 1998 to 2010), where I have supposed that a firm starts to 
increase its product quality when it does not control it in the two first years but does in 
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the two following years. A firm never increases its product quality if it does not control 
it in all the 4 years considered. 
 
Table 6 shows the average labour productivity (sales per employee) obtained and 
average firm wages (labour cost per employee) and the statistic test which controls 
whether these averages are statistically identical between the firms which either start to 
invest in R&D and advertising or start to control their product quality, versus the firms 
which neither invest in R&D and advertising nor control their product quality. Using 
ESEE data from 1990 to 2010 we obtain 299 investor starters and 2,248 non-investors. 
With the other measure of product quality –whether the firm has carried out or 
contracted quality standardization and control works- we obtain 199 firms that start to 
control their product quality and 558 non-controllers. 
 
 Labour productivity and average wages of firms which start to invest in R&D 
and advertising are higher than in firms which do not invest. These differentials are 
statistically significant, except in labour productivity in t = 3. In the case of firms which 
start carrying out or contracting quality standardization and control works, wages and 
labour productivity are higher than in firms which do not, and these differences are all 
statistically significant. 
 
Insert Table 6 about here 
 
 Table 7 shows the results of estimated wages and productivity equations for 
investor starter and non-investor firms. These equations are also estimated with another 
overlap sample of firms in order to avoid the problem of some firms’ not being 
comparable to others due to lack of overlap in the distribution of firms’ characteristics 
between investor starters and non-investors. I use the methodology proposed by Crump 
et al. (2009), who discard all firms with estimated propensity scores outside the range 
[0.1, 0.9]. Table A2 of the appendix shows the probit model that estimates the 
probability of starting to invest in R&D and advertising. This probability has been 
estimated with characteristics of the firms in t = 1 (two years before the starters begin to 
invest). 
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The quality producer wage premium for starters is 9.1% in specification (1) of 
the full sample and 11.7% in specification (2), where I exclude the exporter dummy and 
the percentage of college graduates in order to prevent these variables possibly 
capturing some learning effect. The investor starters pay higher wages and also present 
higher labour productivity (sales per employee) than non-investors with 38.4% increase 
in specification (1) and 50.7% in specification (2). However, the interaction terms 
between the starter dummy variable and dummies for the four periods considered are 
not statistically significant in any case. Consequently, neither wages nor productivity 
shows significant increases in years before and after the decision to invest in R&D and 
advertising. Therefore, the causality relation is not due to the learning-by producing 
quality hypothesis (a higher product quality generates higher productivity and higher 
wages), but to the self-selection hypothesis. That is to say, more-productive firms 
decide to invest in R&D and advertising in order to increase their product quality, 
perhaps because this higher productivity means these kinds of investments can be taken 
with more guarantees.  
 
In the overlap sample there are 64 investor starters (out of 299). Due to the 
common support condition neither wages nor productivity are statistically different 
between investor starters and non-investors in t = 1. The interaction terms between the 
dummy of starting to invest and dummies for the subsequent three considered periods 
are not statistically significant in any case. Therefore, once again wages and 
productivity do not show significant increases in the years before and after the decision 
to invest. 
 
Insert Table 7 about here 
 
 Table 8 shows the results when we use quality control as a measure of product 
quality. The results point in the same line in the case of wages. Firms which start to 
control their product quality pay higher wages than firms which do. The quality 
producer wage premium is 9.1% in the specification (1) and 9.5% in specification (2), 
but the interaction terms between the dummies for starter firms and dummies for the 4 
periods considered are not statistically significant. In the overlap sample there are 141 
controller starters (out of 199) and, once again, these interaction terms are not 
statistically significant. However, in the case of productivity, the results are slightly 
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different. There are no statistically significant differences between control starters and 
non-controllers in the full sample, and the interaction term between the dummy control 
starter and dummy for t = 2 is not statistically significant. But the interaction terms 
between the dummies for starter firms and dummies for t = 3 and t =4 are positive and 
statistically significant. This is the only case where we find some evidence in favour of 
the learning by producing quality hypothesis, so productivity increases after the 
decision to control product quality. In all others cases we can conclude that more-
productive firms with higher wages decide to increase product quality (perhaps because 
their higher productivity means these kinds of decisions and investments can be taken 
with more guarantees). Hence, I find evidence for the self-selection hypothesis. 
 
Insert Table 8 about here 
 
5. THE LINK BETWEEN EXPORTS AND PRODUCT QUALITY 
 
The previous pages show many similarities between exporter wage premium and the 
producer quality wage premium. Moreover, we can also investigate the simultaneity 
between the decisions to export and to increase the product quality. Table 9 shows 
probit models of probability of exporting for firms which start to increase their product 
quality and firms which do not when we use the measure of Sutton (R&D and 
advertising expenditures over sales). In the first four columns I use the same definition 
of investor starter that I have used in previous pages: a firm which starts to increase its 
product quality is a firm which invests any positive amount in R&D and advertising. In 
this case, the dummy variable of starter is not statistically significant in the full sample 
(neither is the interaction terms between this dummy and temporal dummies).  
 
 It is possible that to find this relation is necessary to overcome a positive critical 
value of R&D and advertising expenditures.6 For example, if we use the median of the 
distribution of R&D and advertising expenditures over sales (as a percentage), we can 
define a firm which starts to increase its product quality as a firm which invests more 
than the median in t = 3, 4 (and less than the median in t = 1, 2), and a firm which does 
not start to increase its product quality as a firm which invests less than the median in 
                                                 
6 The distribution of R&D and advertising expenditures over sales (as a percentage) is skewed to the 
right. Its median is 0.59 and its mean is 2.17. 
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t=1;…,4. The second four columns show the probit models with that definition. The 
dummy variable of starter is positive and statistically significant in the full sample, and 
its marginal effect is 0.272. In others words, a firm which starts to increase its product 
quality has a 27.2% higher probability of exporting than a firm which does not increase 
its product quality. However, the interaction terms between that dummy and dummies 
for considered periods are not statistically significant. In the overlap sample the starter 
dummy is not statistically significant by construction and neither are the temporal 
effects. Again, this result shows that firms that start to increase their product quality 
have a higher probability of exporting than firms that never increase their product 
quality, but there is no evidence of learning by producing quality. As more productive 
firms opt to increase product quality they also decide to export, but there is no evidence 
that this increase of product quality generates an increase of probability of exporting in 
subsequent years. 
 
Insert Table 9 about here 
 
Table 10 shows similar estimations when we use the quality control as measure 
of quality product, but in this case the starter dummy is not statistically significant in the 
specification (1). The quality control is a dichotomy variable and we can not do the 
same as with the percentage of R&D and advertising expenditures over sales. In this 
case, in order to find a positive effect of starter dummy in full sample it is necessary to 
exclude the dummies for size in the specification (2), where a firm which starts to 
control its product quality has a 17% higher probability of exporting than a firm which 
does not7, and the interaction terms between the starter dummy and dummies for the 
periods considered are again not statistically significant. As with previous estimations, 
in the overlap sample these coefficients are not statistically significant. 
 
Insert Table 10 about here 
 
Table 11 shows this link between export and product quality from the 
perspective of firms which start to export and firms which never export. As with the 
definition of a firm which starts to increase its product quality, using observation 
                                                 
7 The marginal effect is 0.17 in this case. 
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periods of 4 years, I define an export starter as a firm which does not export in t = 1, 2 
and exports in t = 3, 4. Obviously, non-exporters are firms that do not export in any of 
the years t = 1,…,4. Table 11 shows the estimated effect of starting to export as 
percentage of R&D and advertising expenditures over sales by means of tobit estimates. 
In specification (1) of the full sample this effect is an increase of 0.38 percentage points 
(the marginal effect is 0.387), and the interaction terms between the starter dummy and 
dummies for considered periods are not statistically significant. This lack of 
significance is also obtained in the overlap sample8. Therefore, firms which start to 
export increase their product quality –measured as the percentage of R&D and 
advertising expenditures over sales-, but there is no evidence of learning by exporting, 
because the temporal effects in subsequent years are not statistically significant. 
 
Insert Table 11 about here 
 
Finally, Table 12 show the same effect when we use the control quality as 
measure of product quality by means of probit estimates. This effect is not statistically 
significant when we use the last definition of export starter. However, in this case we 
can do the same as in Table 9. That is, the distribution of export propensity (percentage 
of sales exported) is also skewed to the right (with median equal to 3% and mean equal 
to 17.37%), so we can consider that a firm which starts to export is a firm which does 
not export or, if it does, its export propensity is less than the median in t = 1, 2 and has 
an export propensity higher than the median in t = 3, 4. A firm never exports in this case 
if does not export or, if it does, its export propensity is less than the median in the four 
periods considered. With this definition we find a positive and statistically significant 
effect for starter dummy, but in any case, the interaction terms between starter dummy 
and dummies for considered period are not statistically significant, as in the overlap 
sample. Consequently, we obtain the same conclusion. Firms which start to export 
increase their quality control, but there is no evidence of learning by exporting, because 
the temporal effects in subsequent years on the probability of quality control are not 
statistically significant.  
 
Insert Table 12 about here 
                                                 
8 Table A2 in appendix shows the probit model that estimates the probability of start to export. 
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The main finding of this paper is that there is a quality producer wage premium similar 
to the exporter wage premium. Firms which carry out or contract quality standardization 
and control works increase their percentage of college graduates and engineers by 
almost one percentage point. Moreover, a 10 percentage-point increase in R&D and 
advertising in sales (Sutton’s measure for product quality) increases the percentage of 
college graduates and engineers by 1.2 percentage points. Consequently, firms with 
greater product-quality pay higher wages. The estimated quality producer wage 
premium with this Spanish dataset is around 4.4%-4.7%, but it can reach more than 9% 
for firms which start to improve their product quality.  
 
I have used a methodology similar to that proposed by Schank et al. (2010) in 
order to ascertain the origin of the quality producer wage premium. Most of the results 
point in the same line. I do not find evidence in favour of firms which increase their 
product quality becoming more productive and paying higher wages. In other words, I 
find no evidence in favour of the learning-by-producing quality hypothesis. The results 
indicate that more-productive firms with higher wages decide to increase product 
quality, that is, the evidence favours the self-selection hypothesis. This result is also a 
majority finding in studies that analyze the origin of the exporter wage premium (Singh, 
2010). But there are other similarities between these two wage premiums. On the one 
hand, I find that firms that start to increase their product quality have a higher 
probability of exporting than firms that never increase their product quality, and on the 
other, I obtain that firms that start to export increase their product quality more than 
firms that never export. But in all these cases, the temporal effects in subsequent years 
are not statistically significant, so I do not find evidence for either the learning by 
exporting hypothesis on probability to increase the product quality or for the learning by 
producing quality hypothesis on probability to export. All the results are in favour of the 
self-selection hypothesis. That is to say, more-productive firms with higher wages 
manage to break into international markets and decide to increase product quality. 
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APPENDIX 
Table A1. Survey on Companies’ Strategies 1990-2010 
 All firms Exporters Non-exporters 
 Average Observat. Average Observat. Average Observat.
Average 
wages 
25655.8 
(12416.6) 
38549 
29123.4 
(12600.1) 
23078 
20443.3 
(10095.9) 
15364 
Sales per 
employee 
138957.7 
(177153.2) 
38559 
172128.4 
(203636.5)
23083 
88936.8 
(109084.6) 
15371 
Age 
34.19 
(21.76) 
47442 
39.07 
(23.86) 
22553 
28.95 
(17.14) 
15371 
Size (employees)      
Less 
than 50 
0.504 38637 0.305 23083 0.804 15371 
Between 
50-249 
0.248 38637 0.320 23083 0.142 15371 
More 
than 249 
0.247 38637 0.374 23083 0.054 15371 
Percentage 
of graduates 
4.550 
(7.471) 
47186 
5.641 
(7.147) 
22360 
2.914 
(7.130) 
15110 
Export 
propensity 
17.370 
(25.380) 
38671 
28.953 
(27.173) 
23201   
R+D and 
advertising 
over sales 
(%)  
2.175 
(19.721) 
38223 
2.694 
(4.848) 
22781 
1.404 
(30.533) 
15355 
Quality 
control 
0.434 47494 0.555 22548 0.271 15142 
Standard deviations are in brackets. 
 
Table A2. Probit models 
 
Probability of 
starting to 
export 
Probability of starting 
to invest in R&D and 
advertising 
Probability of 
starting to control 
the product quality 
Log (productivity) 0.311 (5.75) 0.285 (4.23) 0.323 (1.83) 
Percentage of 
graduates -0.002 (0.31) 0.010 (0.79) 0.016 (0.68) 
Size (employees)    
Between 50-
249 0.205 (2.08) -0.007 (004) 0.950 (3.28) 
More than 
249 0.677 (4.77) -0.498 (1.74) 1.915 (4.59) 
Exporter  0.100 (0.75) -0.022 (0.10) 
Age/10 -0.023 (1.01) -0.025 (0.67) -0.156 (2.09) 
Observations 7,918 2,257 541 
Pseudo R2 0.096 0.119 0.259 
All estimated models include a constant, dummies for industries and years. |z|-statistics are in brackets. 
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Table 1. Correlations between the quality measures and the percentage of college 
graduates, the export propensity and the average firm wages by year 
 Quality control R&D and advertising expenditures over sales (%) 
 
Percentage 
of 
graduates 
Export 
propensity 
Average 
firm wage 
Percentage 
of 
graduates 
Export 
propensity 
Average 
firm wage 
1990 0.1302* 0.1378* 0.2312* 0.2980* 0.0548* 0.1957* 
1991     0.0332 0.2534* 
1992     0.0324 0.2715* 
1993     0.0436** 0.2614* 
1994 0.2110* 0.2471* 0.3635* 0.3335* 0.0668* 0.3026* 
1995     0.2663* 0.2779* 
1996     0.1117* 0.2987* 
1997     0.0814* 0.296* 
1998 0.1688* 0.2683* 0.3502* 0.3360* 0.0845* 0.2927* 
1999     0.1260* 0.2852* 
2000     0.0801* 0.2602* 
2001     0.0603* 0.2568* 
2002 0.1761* 0.2131* 0.3160* 0.3174* 0.0806* 0.2447* 
2003     0.0525* 0.2701* 
2004     0.0634* 0.2974* 
2005     0.2663* 0.0657* 
2006 0.1156* 0.1166* 0.1837* 0.3370* 0.0709* 0.2505* 
2007     0.0871* 0.2587* 
2008     0.1002* 0.2251* 
2009     0.1231* 0.2006* 
2010 0.1711* 0.1940* 0.2367* 0.2364* 0.1171* 0.1705* 
* Means significant at 5%. ** Means significant at 10%. 
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Table 2. Correlations between the quality measures and the percentage of college 
graduates, and the export propensity and the average firm wages by industries 
 Quality control R&D and advertising expenditures over sales (%) 
 
Percentage 
of 
graduates 
Export 
propensity 
Average 
firm wage 
Percentage 
of 
graduates 
Export 
propensity 
Average 
firm wage 
1 0.2030* 0.1153* 0.2310* 0.3422* -0.0282 0.4189* 
2 0.2225* 0.1737* 0.2098* 0.2512* 0.0023 0.3059* 
3 0.2124* 0.1059** 0.1448* 0.1824* 0.2297* 0.3894* 
4 0.0903* 0.2381* 0.1941* 0.0771* 0.114* 0.1069* 
5 0.1631* 0.1816* 0.1401* 0.0701* 0.1976* 0.1878* 
6 0.1407* 0.0512 0.1578* 0.1649* 0.0506** 0.1146* 
7 0.2112* 0.2965* 0.2266* 0.0838* -0.031 0.1291* 
8 -0.0804 0.1674* 0.1170* 0.4497* -0.0905* 0.3046* 
9 0.1352* 0.0087 0.1861* 0.3168* -0.2047* 0.1781* 
10 0.1844* 0.2345* 0.1812* 0.1986* 0.1142* 0.0739* 
11 0.1569* 0.0942* 0.1998* 0.1112* 0.3648* 0.103* 
12 0.1082* 0.0955** 0.1013* 0.0628* 0.1603* -0.0738* 
13 0.1475* 0.1996* 0.1534* 0.1113* 0.1717* 0.117* 
14 0.1849* 0.2074* 0.1756* 0.1087* 0.1418* 0.0686* 
15 0.0962** 0.1047** 0.0633 0.2809* 0.0186 0.1277* 
16 0.0709** 0.1617* 0.1199* 0.1707* 0.1495* 0.1256* 
17 0.1146* 0.1222* 0.0932* 0.1392* 0.1448* 0.0830* 
18 0.1734* 0.1411* 0.1973* 0.3382* 0.1481* 0.1061* 
19 0.2295* 0.1599* 0.2503* 0.1473* 0.168* 0.1640* 
20 0.0875 0.1601* 0.1231* 0.0146 0.2509* 0.1623* 
* Means significant at 5%. ** Means significant at 10%. The correlations of quality control only include 
the years information is available (1990, 1994, 1998, 2002 and 2006). Industries: 1 Meat products; 2 Food 
and tobacco; 3 Beverage; 4 Textiles and clothing; 5 Leather, fur and footwear; 6 Timber; 7 Paper; 8 
Printing and Edition; 9 Chemicals products; 10 Plastic and rubber products; 11 Non-metal mineral 
products; 12 Basic metal products; 13 Fabricated metal products; 14 Machinery and equipment; 15 
Computer products, electronics and optical; 16 Electric materials and accessories; 17 Vehicles and 
accessories; 18 Other transport equipment; 19 Furniture; 20 Other manufacturing 
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Table 3. Ratios 
 Firms with R&D and advertising expenditures versus firms without these expenditures 
Firms which control their product quality 
versus firms which do not Exporter versus non-exporter 
 Percentage of graduates 
Average firm 
wage 
Export 
propensity 
Percentage 
of graduates 
Average 
firm wage 
Export 
propensity 
R&D and advertising 
expenditures over sales
Quality 
control 
1990 2.25 1.31 1.93 1.66 1.25 1.72 2.11 1.84 
1991  1.32 2.00    2.38  
1992  1.31 2.47    2.31  
1993  1.39 2.49    2.80  
1994 2.76 1.43 2.36 1.79 1.39 2.15 2.92 2.61 
1995  1.39 2.28    3.20  
1996  1.38 2.14    3.02  
1997  1.33 1.88    2.76  
1998 2.09 1.29 1.82 1.57 1.36 2.11 2.91 2.32 
1999  1.33 2.27    2.91  
2000  1.35 2.09    2.49  
2001  1.34 2.25    2.15  
2002 2.26 1.33 2.34 1.63 1.30 1.77 2.55 2.29 
2003  1.28 1.72    2.32  
2004  1.26 1.83    2.49  
2005  1.24 2.04    2.55  
2006 1.96 1.19 1.96 1.42 1.17 1.39 2.37 1.71 
2007  1.18 1.74    2.69  
2008  1.21 1.86    2.96  
2009  1.18 1.84    3.09  
2010 1.89 1.21 1.84 1.54 1.20 1.67 2.69 1.86 
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Table 4. Tobit estimates of the demand of skilled employees. 
Dependent variable: percentage of college graduates and engineers. 
 Coefficients Marginal effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Percentage of R&D and 
advertising expenses over sales  
0.260 
(13.94)   0.126  
Quality control   1.858 (9.52)   0.905 
Exporter 2.894 (12.88) 
2.664 
(11.91) 
2.674 
(11.92) 1.411 1.287 1.302 
Size (employees)       
50-249 employees 4.568 (19.38) 
4.391 
(18,76) 
4.194 
(17.79) 2.227 2.121 2.042 
More than 249 
employees 
6.046 
(22.44) 
5.616 
(20,86) 
5.496 
(20.23) 2.947 2.7132 2.676 
Age 0.027 (5,95) 
0.023 
(5.16) 
0.026 
(5.88)    
Observations 11,240 11,115 11,223    
Firms 4,660 4,639 4655    
Only observations of years where information about percentage of college graduates and engineers and quality control is updated are 
included: 1990, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006 and 2010. All estimated equations include a constant and dummies for industries and years. |t|-
statistics are in brackets. 
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Table 5. OLS estimates of wage equation. Dependent variable: logarithm of 
average firm wage. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Percentage of R&D 
and advertising 
expenses over sales 
 0.0006 (0.62)  
0.003 
(2.13)  
Dummy=1 if R&D 
and advertising 
expenses>0  
    0,043 (4,81) 
Quality control   0.046 (6.81)   
Size (employees)      
50-249 
employees 
0.199 
(17.82) 
0.198 
(17.79) 
0.189 
(16.89) 
0.212 
(18.10) 
0.195 
(17.52) 
More than 249 
employees 
0.332 
(25.88) 
0.332 
(25.75) 
0.318 
(24.70) 
0.359 
(25.85) 
0.327 
(25.53) 
Percentage of college 
graduates and 
engineers 
0.012 
(15.09) 
0.012 
(14.69) 
0.012 
(15.24)  
0.012 
(14.90) 
Exporter 0.083 (8.62) 
0.083 
(8.51) 
0.077 
(8.05) 
0.091 
(8.95) 
0.076 
(7.85) 
Age/10 0.031 (14,35) 
0.031 
(14.42) 
0.031 
(14.34) 
0.032 
(14.30) 
0.030 
(14.20) 
R2 0.640 0.641 0.641 0.619 0.641 
Observations 11,235 11,110 11,218 11,193 11,235 
Firms 4,659 4,638 4,654 4,649 4,659 
Only observations of years where information about percentage of college graduates and 
engineers and quality control is updated are included: 1990, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006 and 
2010. All estimated equations include a constant and dummies for industries and years. |t|-
statistics are in parentheses. Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedascity and for the 
clustered sampling scheme. 
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Table 6. Labour productivity and average wages 
 R&D and advertising expenses over sales Carrying out or contracting quality standardization and control works  
Starters (N=299) Non-investors (N=2248) 
Prob-value for 
differences of 
means=0 
Starters (N=199) Non-controllers (N=558) 
Prob-value for 
differences of 
means=0 
Labour productivity      
t = 1 106,359.8 73,663.3 0.02 78,993.2 53,864.5 0.00 
t = 2 102,690.4 75,021.2 0.06 84,098.3 52,098.7 0.00 
t = 3 95,683.6 74,946.6 0.14 102,558.6 53,918.1 0.00 
t = 4 96,467.3 76,352.5 0.05 106,046.7 51,898.1 0.00 
Wages       
t = 1 14,647.7 13,357.1 0.03 15,817.3 12,408.9 0.00 
t = 2 14,474.5 13,432.0 0.06 16,075.7 12,538.6 0.00 
t = 3 14,870.0 13,504.6 0.02 16,773.8 13,032.3 0.00 
t = 4 14,723.0 13,602.4 0.05 17,661.4 13,532.9 0.00 
Wages and sales are deflated by the aggregate consumer price index.  
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Table 7. Firms which start to invest in R&D and advertising and firms which do not. Dependent variables: logarithm of average firm 
wage and logarithm of firm labour productivity (sales per employee) 
 log (wage) log(productivity) 
 Full sample Overlap sample Full sample Overlap sample 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Starter 0.087 (2.91) 0.111 (3.40) 0.022 (0.31) 0.014 (0.21) 0.325 (3.79) 0.410 (4.35) 0.102 (0.79) 0.104 (0.81) 
(t = 2)*Starter -0.034 (0.78) -0.027 (0.59) -0.104 (0.77) -0.076 (0.56) -0.022 (0.19) 0.001 (0.01) -0.107 (0.45) -0.116 (0.49) 
(t = 3)*Starter -0.027 (0.59) -0.022 (0.45) -0.169 (1.66) -0.156 (1.54) -0.015 (0.13) 0.003 (0.03) 0.019 (0.10) 0.015 (0.08) 
(t = 4)*Starter -0.026 (0.58) -0.018 (0.38) -0.016 (0.16) -0.018 (0.18) 0.004 (0.03) 0.032 (0.26) -0.065 (0.35) -0.064 (0.34) 
Size (employees)         
50-249 
employees 0.194 (22.61) 0.254 (29.58) 0.179 (5.63) 0.193 (6.54) 0.310 (13.70) 0.499 (21.11) 0.205 (3.58) 0.202 (3.65) 
More than 249 
employees 0.301 (24.43) 0.388 (30.14) 0.412 (5.94) 0.473 (6.85) 0.491 (13.64) 0.779 (18.82) 1.578 (8.14) 1.560 (8.19) 
Percentage of 
college graduates 
and engineers 
0.017 (21.63)  0.008 (3.69)  0.057 (26.23)  -0.003 (0.80)  
Exporter 0.142 (17.90)  0.045 (1.62)  0.500 (25.08)  -0.010 (0.20)  
Age/10 0.034 (15.72) 0.038 (17.01) 0.028 (3.44) 0.035 (4.22) 0.006 (1.08) 0.022 (3.71) 0.085 (4.84) 0.083 (4.97) 
R2 0.514 0.475 0.490 0.477 0.449 0.553 0.709 0.709 
Observations 10,032 10,059 695 695 10,034 10,061 695 695 
Firms 2,547 2547 582 582 2,547 2,547 582 582 
Wages and sales are deflated by the aggregate consumer price index. All estimated equations (OLS) include a constant and dummies for industries, years and periods t. 
|t|-statistics in brackets. Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedascity and for the clustered sampling scheme 
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Table 8. Firms which start to control their product quality and firms which do not. Dependent variables: logarithm of average firm wage 
and logarithm of firm labour productivity (sales per employee) 
 log (wage) log(productivity) 
 Full sample Overlap sample Full sample Overlap sample 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Starter 0.087 (2.09) 0.091 (2.14) 0.063 (1.25) 0.070 (1.31) 0.118 (1.48) 0.128 (1.61) 0.017 (0.17) 0.003 (0.03) 
(t = 2)*Starter 0.022 (0.41) 0.024 (0.43) -0.001 (0.01) -0.011 (0.16) 0.098 (0.94) 0.128 (1.21) 0.042 (0.34) 0.066 (0.51) 
(t = 3)*Starter 0.005 (0.09) 0.016 (0.26) -0.020 (0.28) -0.016 (0.21) 0.202 (1.85) 0.232 (2.07) 0.273 (2.13) 0.290 (2.18) 
(t = 4)*Starter 0.004 (0.09) 0.017 (0.31) 0.028 (0.43) 0.035 (0.52) 0.211 (1.96) 0.257 (2.36) 0.314 (2.45) 0.348 (2.65) 
Size (employees)         
50-249 
employees 0.163 (8.57) 0.214 (13.24) 0.945 (3.04) 0.094 (2.94) 0.229 (6.22) 0.402 (10.81) -0.180 (3.09) -0.128 (2.26) 
More than 249 
employees 0.303 (11.41) 0.376 (13.24) 0.197 (4.17) 0.218 (4.52) 0.400 (5.17) 0.643 (7.22) -0.015 (0.15) 0.097 (0.94) 
Percentage of 
college graduates 
and engineers 
0.010 (7.67)  0.007 (3.00)  0.014 (6.02)  0.001 (0.37)  
Exporter 0.078 (6.05)  0.032 (1.22)  0.406 (15.83)  0.175 (3.81)  
Age/10 0.035 (10.56) 0.039 (11.56) 0.042 (4.48) 0.045 (4.77) 0.014 (2.68) 0.027 (4.99) 0.067 (5.36) 0.065 (5.29) 
R2 0.411 0.377 0.513 0.499 0.337 0.265 0.413 0.400 
Observations 2853 2853 693 693 2854 2854 693 693 
Firms 757 757 476 476 757 757 476 476 
Wages and sales are deflated by the aggregate consumer price index. All estimated equations (OLS) include a constant and dummies for industries, years and periods t.  
|t|-statistics are in brackets. Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedascity and for the clustered sampling scheme. 
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Table 9. Probit models. Probability of exporting. Firms which start to invest in R&D and advertising and firms which do not 
 Firms which start to invest in R&D and advertising (any 
positive amount) and firms which do not 
Firms which start to invest in R&D and advertising more 
than the median and firms which do not invest or invest 
less than the median 
 Full sample Overlap sample Full sample Overlap sample 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Starter 0.217 (1.29) 0.258 (1.53) -0.293 (0.85) -0.291 (0.85) 0.706 (4.58) 0.687 (4.42) -0.178 (0.45) -0.172 (0.43) 
(t = 2)*Starter 0.181 (0.78) 0.175 (0.75) 0.462 (0.80) 0.466 (0.81) 0.022 (0.10) 0.030 (0.14) 0.678 (1.06) 0.693 (1.06) 
(t = 3)*Starter 0.084 (0.37) 0.088 (0.39) 0.141 (0.26) 0.153 (0.29) 0.045 (0.21) 0.063 (0.29) -0.426 (0.80) -0.444 (0.81) 
(t = 4)*Starter 0.191 (0.86) 0.190 (0.85) -0.223 (0.48) -0.207 (0.45) 0.127 (0.59) 0.143 (0.67) 0.004 (0.01) -0.001 (0.00) 
Size (employees)         
50-249 
employees 0.718 (18.25) 0.744 (19.11) 1.198 (9.11) 1.184 (9.32) 0.883 (26.49) 0.929 (28.45) 0.938 (4.48) 1.070 (5.25) 
More than 249 
employees 1.286 (20.84) 1.319 (21.95) 1.626 (4.19) 1.566 (4.52) 1.379 (25.19) 1.414 (26.35) 0.693 (4.84) 0.924 (5.35) 
Percentage of 
college graduates 
and engineers 
0.044 (10.87)  -0.006 (0.71)  0.044 (12.41)  0.050 (2.22)  
Age 0.014 (12.07) 0.013 (12.10) 0.016 (4.62) 0.045 (3.77) 0.014 (15.04) 0.013 (14.98) 0.026 (5.36) 0.024 (3.80) 
Pseudo R2 0.248 0.235 0.162 0.162 0.264 0.252 0.169 0.161 
Observations 10,034 10,061 695 695 13,393 13,726 849 849 
Firms 2,547 2,547 584 584 3,468 3,468 733 733 
Estimated equations in the full sample include a constant and dummies for industries, years and periods t. The dummies for industries and years have been excluded in the 
overlap sample due to collinearity problems. |t|-statistics are in brackets. Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedascity and for the clustered sampling scheme. 
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Table 10. Probit models. Probability of exporting.  
Firms which start to control their product quality and firms which do not 
 Full sample Overlap sample 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Starter -0.026 (0.12) 
0.433 
(2.10) 
-0.412 
(1.31) 
0.116 
(0.44) 
(t = 2)*Starter 0.358 (1.26) 
0.175 
(0.64) 
0.619 
(1.54) 
0.290 
(0.83) 
(t = 3)*Starter 0.215 (0.76) 
0.105 
(0.38) 
0.439 
(1.10) 
0.148 
(0.43) 
(t = 4)*Starter 0.397 (1.36) 
0.318 
(1.13) 
0.782 
(1.97) 
0.508 
(1.42) 
Size (employees)     
50-249 employees 0.961 (11.37)  
0.752 
(6.67)  
More than 249 
employees 
1.578 
(8.52)  
2.010 
(7.68))  
Percentage of college 
graduates and 
engineers 
0.002 
(0.41)  
-0.007 
(1.33)  
Age 0.008 (5.12) 
0.014 
(8.43) 
-0.003 
(0.97) 
0.012 
(3.68) 
Pseudo R2 0.181 0.128 0.129 0.039 
Observations 2,858 2,875 693 693 
Firms 757 757 476 476 
Estimated equations in the full sample include a constant and dummies for 
industries, years and periods t. The dummies for industries and years have been 
excluded in the overlap sample due to collinearity problems. |t|-statistics are in 
brackets. Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedascity and for the clustered 
sampling scheme. 
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Table 11. Tobit models of R&D and advertising expenditures over sales. Firms 
which start to export and firms which never export 
 Full sample Overlap sample 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Starter 0.786 (3.36) 0.777 (3.25) 0.711 (0.45) 1.200 (0.72) 
(t = 2)*Starter -0.318 (0.96) -0.283 (0.84) 0.704 (0.32) 0.702 (0.30) 
(t = 3)*Starter 0.103 (0.31) 0.162 (0.48) 0.116 (0.05) -0.645 (0.28) 
(t = 4)*Starter 0.126 (0.38) 0.133 (0.40) 1.294 (0.56) -0.644 (0.27) 
Size (employees)     
50-249 
employees 0.714 (13.27) 0.918 (16.76) 1.016 (1.06) 0.192 (0.19) 
More than 249 
employees 2.554 (27.12) 3.135 (34.29) 3.812 (2.81) 1.080 (0.79) 
Percentage of 
college graduates 
and engineers 
0.080 (30.22)  0.323 (6.84)  
Age 0.016 (14.39) 0.018 (16.35) 0.141 (7.03) 0.128 (6.06) 
Pseudo R2 0.041 0.035 0.093 0.079 
Observations 31,610 31,745 532 532 
Firms 8,051 8,051 512 512 
All estimated equations include a constant and dummies for industries, years and periods t.  
|t|-statistics are in brackets.  
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Table 12. Probit models of quality control. Firms which start to export and firms which never export 
 Firms which start to export (any positive amount) and 
firms which do not 
Firms which start to export with an export propensity 
more than the median and firms which do not export or 
have an export propensity less than the median 
 Full sample Overlap sample(1) Full sample Overlap sample 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Starter 0.106 (0.97) 0.108 (0.99) -0.163 (0.53) -0.181 (0.58) 0.356 (3.68) 0.349 (3.60) 0.153 (0.79) 0.153 (0.79) 
(t = 2)*Starter 0.049 (0.32) 0.062 (0.41) -0.260 (0.59) -0.259 (0.59) 0.081 (0.60) 0.081 (0.60) 0.071 (0.25) 0.071 (0.25) 
(t = 3)*Starter 0.135 (0.88) 0.142 (0.93) 0.136 (0.31) 0.153 (0.35) 0.088 (0.65) 0.087 (0.65) 0.320 (1.10) 0.320 (1.10) 
(t = 4)*Starter 0.069 (0.45) 0.084 (0.55) 0.509 (1.12) 0.545 (1.20) 0.027 (0.20) 0.019 (0.14) 0.121 (0.43) 0.121 (0.43) 
Size (employees)         
50-249 
employees 0.608 (25.03) 0.617 (25.65) 1.044 (5.85) 1.066 (6.00) 0.610 (27.03) 0.616 (27.52) 0.494 (3.23) 0.493 (3.24) 
More than 249 
employees 0.675 (16.58) 0.774 (19.91) 1.425(8.44) 1.368 (8.56) 0.746 (20.41) 0.823 (23.49) 0.719 (4.40) 0.719 (4.40) 
Percentage of 
college graduates 
and engineers 
0.008 (6.51)  -0.009 (1.74)  0.007 (6.72)  0.0002 (0.05)  
Age/10 -0.004 (0.85) 0.003 (0.07) 0.001 (0.04) 0.002 (0.06) 0.001 (0.13) 0.005 (1.10) 0.053 (2.36) 0.053 (2.40) 
Pseudo R2 0.090 0.090 0.129 0.124 0.100 0.099 0.174 0.174 
Observations 31,768 31,904 540 540 35,103 35,254 1,316 1,316 
Firms 8,051 8,051 520 520 8,889 8,889 1,246 1,246 
(1) The dummies for industries and years have been excluded due to collinearity problems.The rest of the estimated equations include dummies for industries, years and 
periods t. |t|-statistics are in brackets. Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedascity and for the clustered sampling scheme. 
